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Neogeography and the delusion of democratisation 
Abstract 
Within the academic and popular discussion of neogeography, it is routinely argued 
that the process of producing and using geographical information has been 
fundamentally democratised. Neogeography, in contrast to ‘established geography’, 
especially uses the argument that it is for anyone, anywhere and anytime.  Similar 
arguments have been used to praise the growth in Web GIS since the mid-1990s and 
seem to be persistent in the conceptualisation of these technologies. However, what 
is the nature of this democracy, and to what extent do the technologies that are used 
in neogeography fulfil this democratisation promise? 
In this contribution, the framework offered by Andrew Feenberg in his critical theory 
of technology, and especially his call for ‘deep democratisation’, is used to provide a 
critique of these assertions of the nature of neogeography. The analysis shows that, 
unlike early critical GIS and the literature on participatory GIS, the analysis of 
neogeography adopted an instrumentalist interpretation of the technology and its 
applications. This view claims that technology is value-free and there is a separation 
between means and ends. This type of argument ignores and disguises the values that 
are integrated inexorably in advanced technologies. Once the values are exposed and 
discussed, neogeography becomes far less exciting and transformative. It becomes 
clearer that there is a separation between technological elite and a wider group of 
uninformed, labouring participants who are not empowered through the use of the 
technology. There are also multiple obstacles that limit the democratic potential of 
neogeography.  
The analysis progresses by considering the hierarchy of hacking, understood here as 
the ability to alter and change the meaning and use of a specific technological system. 
This hierarchy further explains the democratisation potentialities and limits of 
neogeography. Because of the reduced barriers, neogeography does offer some 
increased level of democratisation but, to fulfil this potential, it requires careful 
implementation that takes into account social and political aspects.  
Keywords: democratisation, neogeography, Participatory GIS, Philosophy of 
Technology, Deep Democratisation, hacker culture  
Introduction 
Since the emergence of the World Wide Web (Web) in the early 1990s, claims about its 
democratic potential and practice are a persistent feature in the discourse about it. While 
awareness of the potential of ‘anyone, anytime, anywhere’ to access and use information 
was extolled for a long while (for an early example see Batty 1997), the emergence of Web 
2.0 in the mid-2000s (O’Reilly 2005) increased this notion. In the popular writing of authors 
such as Friedman (2006), these sentiments are amplified by highlighting the ability of 
anyone to ‘plug into the flat earth platform’ from anywhere and anytime.   
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Around the middle of the decade, the concept of neogeography appeared and the ability to 
communicate geographic information over the Web (in what is termed the GeoWeb) gained 
prominence (see Haklay et al. 2008). Neogeography increased the notion of participation 
and access to geographic information, now amplified through the use of the political term 
democratisation. The following citations provide a flavour of the discourse within academic 
and popular writing – for example, in Mike Goodchild’s declaration that ‘Just as the PC 
democratised computing, so systems like Google Earth will democratise GIS’ (quoted in 
Butler 2006), or Turner’s (2006) definition of neogeography as ‘Essentially, Neogeography is 
about people using and creating their own maps, on their own terms and by combining 
elements of an existing toolset. Neogeography is about sharing location information with 
friends and visitors, helping shape context, and conveying understanding through 
knowledge of place’.  This definition emphasises the wide access to the technology in 
everyday practice. Similar and stronger statements can be found in Warf and Sui (2010) who 
clarify that ‘neogeography has helped to foster an unprecedented democratization of 
geographic knowledge’ (p. 200) and, moreover, ‘Wikification represents a significant step 
forward in the democratization of geographic information, shifting control over the 
production and use of GIS data from a handful of experts to large groups of users’ (ibid.). 
Even within international organisations this seems to be the accepted view as Nigel Snoad, 
strategy adviser for the communications and information services unit of the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), stated: ‘On the technology side, 
Google, Microsoft and OpenStreetMap have really democratized mapping’ (cited in Lohr 
2011). 
However, what is the nature of this democratisation and what are its limits? To what extent 
do the technologies that mediate the access to, and creation of, geographic information 
allow and enable such democratisation? 
To answer these questions, we need to explore the meaning of democratisation and, more 
specifically, within the context of interaction between people and technology. According to 
the Oxford English Dictionary, democratisation is ‘the action of rendering, or process of 
becoming, democratic’, and democracy is defined as ‘Government by the people; that form 
of government in which the sovereign power resides in the people as a whole, and is 
exercised either directly by them (as in the small republics of antiquity) or by officers 
elected by them. In modern use often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have 
equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’ [emphasis 
added]. A more colloquial notion of democratisation, and a much weaker one, is making a 
process or activity that used to be restricted to an elite or privileged group available to a 
wider group in society and potentially to all. For example, with mobile telephony now 
available across the globe, the statement ‘mobile telephony has been democratised’ aims to 
express the fact that, merely three decades ago, only the rich and powerful members of 
Western society had access to this technology. 
Therefore, it is accepted from the start that the notion of democratisation cited above is 
more about the potential of neogeography to make the ability to assemble, organise and 
share geographical information accessible to anyone, anywhere and anytime and for a 
variety of purposes than about advancing the specific concept of democracy. And yet, it will 
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be wrong to ignore the fuller meaning of the concept. Democratisation has a deeper 
meaning in respect of making geographic information technologies more accessible to 
hitherto excluded or marginalised groups in a way that assists them to make a change in 
their life and environment. Democratisation evokes ideas about participation, equality, the 
right to influence decision making, support to individual and group rights, access to 
resources and opportunities, etc. (Doppelt 2006). Using this stronger interpretation of 
democratisation reveals the limitation of current neogeographic practices and opens up the 
possibility of considering alternative development of technologies that can, indeed, be 
considered as democratising.  
To explore this juncture of technology and democratisation, this paper relies on Andrew 
Feenberg’s critical philosophy of technology, especially as explored in his Questioning 
Technology (1999) and Transforming Technology (2002), which is useful as he addresses 
issues of democratisation and technology directly. For readers who are not familiar with the 
main positions within philosophy of technology, a very brief overview – based on Feenberg’s 
interpretation (1999) – is provided. This will help to explain his specific critique and 
suggestion for ‘deep democratisation’ of technology. 
Equipped with these concepts, attention is turned to the discussion about the democratic 
potential of Geographic Information Systems (GIS), which appears in early discussions about 
GIS and society in the 1990s, and especially to the discussions within the literature on 
(Public) Participatory GIS (PPGIS/PGIS – assumed to be interchangeable here) and critical 
GIS. As we shall see, discussions about empowerment, marginalisation and governance are 
central to this literature from its inception and provide the foundations to build a deeper 
concept of democratisation when considering neogeographic practices.  
Based on this historical understanding, the core of the paper explores why it is that 
neogeographic practices are assumed to be democratising and, more importantly, what the 
limitations are on their democratic potential. To do that, a hierarchy of ‘hacking’ – that is 
the artful alteration of technology beyond the goals of its original design or intent – is 
suggested. Importantly, here ‘hacking’ does not mean the malicious alteration of technology 
or unauthorised access to computer systems, or the specific culture of technology 
enthusiasts (‘hacker culture’). The term is used to capture the first and second 
instrumentation that Feenberg (1996, 2002) describes.  As we shall see, by exploring the 
ability to alter systems, there is some justification in the democratisation claims of 
neogeography as it has, indeed, improved the outreach of geographic technologies and 
opened up the potential of their use in improving democratic processes, but in a much more 
limited scope and extent. The paper concludes with observations on the utilisation of 
neogeographic technologies within the participatory process that aim to increase 
democratisation in its deeper sense.  
For the rest of the discussion, the term ‘neogeographic technologies’ is used to describe the 
technological assemblage of systems that facilitate the neogeography practice – from 
cameras that record the location from which a picture is taken, to online mapping systems 
that allow users to add geographic details to them, to places where they can visualise or 
share the information that they have captured.  
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Philosophy of technology and its main schools of thought  
As outlined above, the aim of this section is to introduce an unfamiliar reader to the main 
positions in thinking about technology and society that are common within the philosophy 
of technology, so as to introduce some of the core concepts that will be used in the current 
analysis. For a more comprehensive exploration of philosophy of technology, see Dusek 
(2006), as well as Scharff and Dusek (2002). 
Technology became a focus of scholarly studies and discussion only during the final years of 
the 19th century (Dusek 2006). Most of the ideas that are now influencing the philosophy of 
technology were developed during the 20th century, and among the notable contributors to 
this discussion are Martin Heidegger, Herbert Marcuse, John Dewey and Lewis Mumford 
(Feenberg 1999). Even the word ‘technology’ gained its current sense only at the beginning 
of the 20th century (Marx 1999). Only since the 1970s has technology received concrete 
philosophical attention with the growth of the philosophy of technology, and, as Feenberg 
(1999) noted, ‘the human significance of technology is largely unmapped territory’ (p. 1).  
Feenberg (1999) identified four main streams of thought on the essence of technology and 
its linkage to society (Figure 1). These are instrumentalism, determinism, substantivism and 
critical theory. The deterministic view follows the ideas of Karl Marx and Charles Darwin, 
assuming that technology is actually a force of its own with evolution that, while carried out 
by humans, by and large is not dependent on them. If one group of humans doesn’t develop 
a specific technology, another will. It can be encapsulated as the view that technological 
progress supports humanity’s march to freedom and happiness. Technology is also viewed 
as neutral as it provides a means that can be used for any purpose. Hence, technology is an 
extension of nature and outside the political realm.  
By the 1940s and 1950s, another view emerged: the substantive view developed once it 
became clear that technology has political implications. Though still perceived as 
autonomous, technology is not viewed as a neutral force but as a force that embodies 
specific values such as control over labour and resources, and a notion of efficiency that is 
mostly about maximising economic output. The technologies that we use shape modern life. 
Thus, it is impossible to separate means from ends. The way we do things determines who 
and what we are. Martin Heidegger and, more pronouncedly, Jacques Ellul (1964) are two of 
the prominent advocates of the substantive view. This view became especially popular 
during the 1960s and 1970s as the results of technological development, such as the atom 
bomb, became apparent and a certain dystopian view of the impact of technology gained 
attention.    
The same period marks the emergence of a third view based on critical theory. In the first 
years of this theoretical development, Herbert Marcuse and Michel Foucault stand out as 
critics of scientific ideologies and technological determinism. They do not accept the 
unilinear path of technology, but argue that technological progress is shaped by social 
control. At the same time (inconsistently) they argue that modern forms of social control 
and domination are essentially technical. Using Feenberg’s (1999) terms, this view is ‘left 
dystopian’ and is influenced by the substantivists.  
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This critical view of technology is dominant in current studies of technology. In the last 20 
years, the ideas in science and technology studies (Latour 1993, 1996) on the nature of 
scientific projects have gained ground and the critical approach has evolved into 
constructivism. According to this view, technology must be studied and understood as an 
integral part of society. Technological projects do not have a single, clear path from 
inception to production, but multiple routes and directions. The success of any given 
technology does not lie with superior design or efficiency, but in the social context and 
support that it receives. The process of creating technological artefacts is socially 
constructed until ‘closure’ happens, in which the specific technology becomes fixed. Once 
closure happens, the technology becomes a ‘black box’ and the social negotiations that 
accompany its creation are forgotten.  
The final position is the instrumentalist view, which, while accepting that technology is not 
autonomous, still separates means from ends. Technology by itself does not encapsulate 
values, and it is the way in which it is applied that gives it its social meaning. The 
instrumentalist view is common today and has a wide range of supporters. Negroponte 
(1995) and Friedman (2006) both praise the inherent capabilities of digital technologies to 
improve the quality of life and society in general, and do not see any values that are integral 
to it. It is also the common view among technology enthusiasts (as any occasional reading of 
Wired or The Economist will reveal). 
The four main positions are presented in Figure 1. 
Technology is: Autonomous Humanly controlled 
Neutral  
(Means and Ends are 
separated) 
Determinism 
(Traditional Marxism, 
Darwinistic explanations) 
Instrumentalism 
(Liberal view of 
technological progress) 
Value-laden 
(Means and Ends cannot 
be separated) 
Substantivism 
(Ellul, Heideggar) 
Critical Theory 
(‘Left dystopian’, 
constructivism) 
Figure 1 - Technology and Society: main theoretical frameworks (after Feenberg 1999) 
These classes represent ‘ideal types’ of thought, usually associated with a specific writer. For 
example, and as noted, Jacques Ellul is associated with the substantive view. In The 
Technological Society (1964) Ellul gives a bleak account of the influence of technology on 
humanity. He views technology as an unstoppable force that is taking over society and 
impacts every aspect of life. The only solution that he provides is the spiritual transition of 
humanity. However, in practice, it is more difficult to link a person or writing to a specific 
view but rather to locate it somewhere in the continuum between the different positions, 
although it must be noted that, outside technology studies, the instrumentalist view is the 
most dominant within current social science (Feenberg 2002).  
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Feenberg’s critical theory of technology 
Within the critical philosophy of technology, Feenberg’s theory is one of the more 
comprehensive and detailed (Veak 2006). He developed and advanced it through several 
books in the 1990s, culminating in Questioning Technology (1999), Transforming Technology 
(2002) and a collection of articles that discuss the theory in Democratizing Technology (Veak 
2006). Feenberg’s view is constructivist: that is, emphasising that technology development 
is humanly controlled and encapsulates values and politics, thus it should be open to 
democratic control and intervention.  
At the core of his approach is the idea that technology can be used to the betterment of life 
conditions and society in general by carefully and rationally choosing technological paths 
that take into account the various interests and needs of a wide range of groups in society in 
a democratic way, and by that he means taking into account the concerns and needs of 
society as a whole. Many science and technology studies, such as Latour’s (1996), have 
demonstrated that technology is not created with a single set of values, but through 
negotiation of multiple actors and conflicting interests. Therefore, technology can and 
should be seen as a result of political negotiations that lead to its production and use. In too 
many cases, the complexities of technological systems are used to concentrate power within 
small groups of technological, financial and political elites and to prevent the wider body of 
citizens from meaningful participation in shaping it and deciding what role it should have in 
the everyday.  
Feenberg highlights that technology encapsulates an ambivalence between the 
‘conservation of hierarchy’, which most technologies promote and reproduce hence the 
continuity in power structures in advanced capitalist societies despite technological 
upheaval, and ‘democratic rationalisation’, which are the aspects of new technologies that 
undermine existing power structures and allow for new opportunities by marginalised or 
ignored groups to assert themselves. Feenberg notes that technical codes always 
encapsulate significant social values such as efficiency or capitalism, and that these technical 
codes seem to circularly use the meaning that objects and technical process acquired 
through society (which are emphasising these values) to affirm and stabilise this specific 
meaning. In so doing, technical codes seem ‘self-evident’ and unproblematic. Importantly, 
‘Technical representation is not primarily about the selection of a trusted personnel, but 
involves the embodiment of social and political demands in technical codes’ (1999, p. 142).   
Based on this understanding, Feenberg calls for a ‘deep democratisation’ of technology, 
which can be achieved through the integration of democratic rationalisation of technical 
codes, combined with a deliberate democratic control over technical institutions: ‘such deep 
democratization would alter the structure and knowledge base of management and 
expertise. The exercise of authority would come to favour agency in technically mediated 
social domains. Deep democratization promises an alternative to technocracy. Instead of 
popular agency appearing as an anomaly and an interference, it would be normalized and 
incorporated into the standard procedures of technical design’ (1999, p. 147). 
Feenberg offers a useful analytical framework as a way to understand technology 
differentiates between primary and secondary instrumentation (1999, 2006). Primary 
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instrumentation focuses on the functional aspects such as separating objects from their 
wider everyday or regular use context to make it possible to turn them into technological 
artefacts, or the reduction of any ‘unwanted’ characteristics that cannot be part of 
automated and easily controlled technology. Secondary instrumentation, on the other hand, 
opens up the ability of social intervention, as this is the process through which technology is 
constituted into specific social and environmental contexts. Notice that primary and 
secondary instrumentations do not happen separately, but happen at the same time for any 
given technology. Thus, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers are created with concepts 
of efficiency, accuracy and consumerism but enrol into a specific context of use in which 
participants might use them in conjunction with mobile phones and software application to 
assert control over another person and create ‘geoslavery’ (Dobson and Fisher 2003) or, in 
the context of play, in the practice of geocaching where participants use them to locate 
‘hidden treasures’. 
Feenberg’s theory provides a powerful critique of the instrumentalist view of technology, 
which assumes the separation of means from ends, and therefore claims that technology by 
itself is value-free and outside the realm of political negotiation and social influence. The 
analysis of technological ambivalence highlights how technological codes are created in a 
‘common-sense’ approach that hides their social, ethical, moral and environmental 
implications. Once the technical code is stabilised, society is expected to accept technology 
the way it is without questioning it. Yet, if we accept that all technologies have politics, the 
instrumentalist view turns out to be one of the mechanisms through which existing power 
structures are maintained and reproduced.  
The set of concepts from the philosophy of technology in general, and Feenberg’s theory in 
particular, will help in the analysis of the nature of neogeography and its associated 
technologies. The first issue is to notice a fundamental difference between the literature 
about neogeography and that of critical GIS and PPGIS. As we shall see, while the former is 
mostly supporting the instrumentalist view of technology, the latter is well within the critical 
perspective of technology.  
Democratisation in neogeography versus participatory and critical 
GIS 
Feenberg’s suggestion for deep democratisation, ideally at the primary and secondary 
instrumentation levels, chimes with many of the discussions that appeared within the 
literature on participatory GIS and critical GIS. Historically, PPGIS/PGIS, or the opening of 
engagement with GIS to larger groups of users and using it for community-centred activity 
while noticing how it is embedded within existing social and political structures and 
processes, was first to emerge from the discussion on ‘GIS and Society’ in the mid-1990s. 
Critical GIS, which followed suit, focused on issues of representation, meaning and the 
consequences of digital representation on social knowledge and power (Elwood 2008). 
While in some contexts it is useful to maintain the differentiation between these fields of 
study, for the sake of the discussion here, especially because of the focus on 
democratisation in this paper, attempting to delineate the subtle differentiations between 
these areas can lead to further confusion. From the point of view of interpreting technology 
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as humanly controlled and open to social interventions, both PGIS and critical GIS belong to 
critical theory of technology and therefore will be explored together.  
From its inception, the literature on PGIS and critical GIS was explicit about the sense in 
which the tools should serve social purposes. The publication of Ground Truth (Pickles 
1995a) is recognised as an important milestone in the evolution of these areas of study. The 
final two chapters are the precursors of PGIS/PPGIS (Harris et al. 1995) and critical GIS 
(Pickles 1995b) and both discuss the need to include ‘deep’ democratisation in the 
application of GIS, with Harris et al. (1995) explicitly calling for applications that are ‘broad-
based, inclusive, gender-sensitive, and biased towards marginalised people’ (p. 218). In 
another early paper, originally from a meeting dedicated to the empowerment and 
marginalisation power of GIS in 1998, Leitner et al. (2002) highlight the need to consider 
how the use of GIS can impact democratic process inside community organisations, and not 
only within the wider political system, as well as noticing how the technology itself can lead 
to changes in priorities of various organisations. The literature that followed included 
extensive discussion of the democratisation potential of information when used to assist 
marginalised communities (Sawicki and Craig 1996) and the political and governance 
implications of PGIS practices  (Ghose 2001, 2007; Elwood 2002; McCall 2003). For a wider 
discussion see Sieber (2006), O’Sullivan (2006) and Elwood (2008).             
Against this rich engagement with the deeper issues of democratisation, discussions about 
neogeography seem to focus on the instrumentalist understanding of technology. One of 
the early examples of academic writing that highlights the importance of neogeographic 
practices is provided by Miller (2006) who takes a functional approach to the concept of 
GIS/2 (Schroeder 1996) and argues that Google Maps mashups provided all the necessary 
functionality – as demonstrated during the response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster – 
while the discussion about the concept for over a decade failed to achieve what Google 
Maps successfully implemented. What Miller fails to notice is that GIS/2 was never about 
functionality. Even when Sieber (2004) was arguing for the possibility of rewiring GIS to 
make it closer to the GIS/2 concept, she was not discussing the technology but, rather, 
aspects of empowerment: providing the tools that will allow increased control over the 
technology by those in disadvantaged and marginalised positions in society. As noted, this 
understanding of PGIS and critical GIS as a social practice is central to the understanding of 
the role of technology within specific contexts.  
In contrast, neogeography is mostly represented in a decontextualised way as the citation in 
the introduction from Turner’s Introduction to Neogeography demonstrates – it does not 
discuss who the people are that benefit and if there is a deeper purpose, beyond fun, for 
their engagement in neogeography. Goodchild’s work on Volunteered Geographic 
Information (VGI) is also represented in a value-free manner – for example, the closing 
sentences of his seminal 2007 paper state: ‘Moreover, such volunteering appears to provide 
the only feasible solution to… the supply of geographic information worldwide… But 6 
billion citizen observers, equipped with the means to upload their observations, could 
provide a very effective replacement. The willingness to do so is clearly there, as is the 
technology to integrate their inputs.’ (p. 31). Importantly, VGI is more concerned with the 
data and less with the process. However, as the Goodchild and Turner discussion (Wilson 
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and Graham, this issue) demonstrates, the containment relationships between VGI and 
neogeography are far from simple and there is a significant overlap.  
It is wrong to state that all writing about neogeography adopts the instrumentalist view 
wholeheartedly, as there are examples of critical approaches to the technology such as 
Graham’s (2010) analysis of the construction of place, Crutcher and Zook’s (2009) analysis of 
the inequality in neogeographic coverage of New Orleans post-Katrina or Elwood’s (2008) 
discussion of VGI from a critical GIS perspective. However, these interventions are limited in 
their scope and it is telling that Elwood herself, in her review of neogeography and VGI 
(2009), only briefly discusses issues of empowerment, participation and marginalisation 
although this is rectified in her 2010 review. Warf and Sui (2010) who are cited above with 
regard to the use of the term ‘democratisation’ also view neogeography as ‘active bilateral 
contacts between the producers and analysts of geographic data, resulting in a constantly 
mutating body of work, usually without a clearly defined political agenda’ (p. 200, emphasis 
added), while noticing the social ambivalence in its practices and highlighting some of its 
secondary instrumentation.  
Despite these caveats, which are relevant in the academic discussion about neogeography, 
it is important to notice that the corporations, technology start-up companies and 
technology enthusiasts that are creating the neogeographic landscape are all adopting the 
instrumentalist point of view, while ignoring the deeply embedded values (Bellamy-Foster 
and McChesney 2011).  
In summary, the instrumentalist approach is central to the development and practice of 
neogeography. The user is viewed as a free agent who makes their own informed decisions 
about the use of a system and can put it to use to promote their own goals, while being able 
to consider the full context of its use. Because there is nothing that prevents anyone, 
anytime and anywhere and for any purpose from using the system, democratisation has 
been achieved. Given this analysis, what can we learn about the democratisation of 
geographic information by examining the observed characteristics of neogeography?  
The reality of neogeography and democratisation  
There are many empirical reasons to reject the claim for democratisation and the recurring 
theme of ‘anyone, anywhere, anytime’. Such reasons include the differential access to 
computers and communication, which is an ongoing theme about the Web (USDOC/NTIA 
1999, Castells 1996), and, even today, only 70% of UK households have access to the Web; 
more importantly, many of the remaining households do not see the benefit in joining 
online (PwC 2009). Beyond this, there is secondary digital exclusion (Hargittai 2002), which 
relates to the skills and abilities of people to participate in online activities beyond 
rudimentary browsing.  
So much for ‘anyone’, but also the ‘anywhere’ should be questioned – differential access to 
the Web exists between large urban centres and rural communities (Bellamy-Foster and 
McChesney 2011) to the degree that the UK government had to enact a special law (Digital 
Economy Bill) to try to tackle the failure of broadband access across the country. The issue 
of access is compounded by the prohibitive costs of ‘data roaming’ charges, levied by mobile 
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network operators, which make the use of mobile Web access expensive exactly at the time 
when a user is likely to explore new places and use neogeographic tools.  
There are further issues that empirical observations highlight about the limits of 
democratisation of neogeographic practices. Participation inequalities (Nielsen 2006) have 
been demonstrated in many user-contributed systems with very few contributing a lot and 
many contributing very little. The pattern was identified in OpenStreetMap (Budhathoki et 
al. 2010) and in patterns of geotagged photos. This pattern is exclusionary, as it highlights 
and rewards the participants who have more time and resources to contribute heavily to 
the system, while ignoring and marginalising other contributors.  
These exclusionary aspects are amplified by demographic biases. Many of these systems are 
male-dominated, contributed to by highly educated and usually affluent members of society 
(Budhathoki et al. 2010) and their cultural practices are sometimes aggressive and 
misogynistic, thus creating further alienation (Cohen 2011). As Graham (2010) aptly 
demonstrated, the results of all these processes are in variable representations of places, 
languages and local interests. Notice that these social practices within the virtual 
communities that neogeography creates actively work against democratic practices and the 
software of the systems is designed to promote the strongest contributors while 
marginalising small-scale contributions.   
Further exclusions happen not only due to the creation of systems that mainly focus on 
corporate interests (and values) in neogeographic technologies (Warf and Sui 2010) but also 
because ‘epistemologies, vocabularies, and categories of data structures do not or cannot 
encompass the experiences, knowledge claims, and identities of some social groups or 
places’ (Elwood 2008, p. 178).  
In summary, the social, economic, structural and technical evidence should be enough to 
qualify and possibly withdraw the democratisation claims that are attached to 
neogeographic practices. The democratic vision offered is a ‘cyberlibertarian’ or ‘techno-
libertarian’ one (Winner 1997, Borsook 2000), which highlights ‘radical individualism, 
enthusiasm for free market economy, disdain for the role of government, and enthusiasm 
for the power of business firms’ (Winner 1997, p. 16) and does not strive to reach out to 
marginalised groups or try to accommodate diverse opinions.  
Yet, while the evidence shows that the concept of democratisation is problematic in the 
praxis of neogeography, we still need to deal with its democratic potential. This is necessary 
to address the continued conceptualisation of digital exclusion as a problem that can be 
solved – for example in the discussion between Turner and Goodchild (Wilson and Graham 
this issue). We turn to this level of analysis in the next section. 
Hacking and the democratic potential of neogeography 
To address the potential of democratisation within neogeographic tools, we need to return 
to Feenberg’s idea of deep democratisation, and the ability of ordinary citizens to direct 
technical codes and influence them so they can include alternative meanings and values. By 
doing so, we can explore the potential of neogeographic practices to support 
democratisation in its fuller sense. At the very least, citizens should be able to reuse existing 
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technology and adapt it so it can be used to their own goals and to represent their own 
values. As the previous section demonstrated, the current corporatisation of the Web 
means that citizens cannot expect tools to emerge by themselves through the market, but 
need to create them.  
To analyse this potential, I add to Feenberg’s analysis of primary and secondary 
instrumentation a hierarchy of hacking, here understood as the ability to stretch the 
functionality and capabilities of a given system beyond those that are provided by its 
creators. The hierarchy is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 – Levels of hacking  
There are four levels that are suggested here and are opened by a system: meaning, use, 
shallow technical and deep technical. They are explained, with examples that are relevant to 
the discussion of neogeography, below.   
The first, and most popular, is ‘meaning hacking’. Here, the participant is not making any 
change to the system or trying to intervene in its technical code, so its primary 
instrumentation remains untouched. The change to the system is done in its secondary 
instrumentation, through provision of new context and meaning to its application. This can 
happen when users reinterpret information that is provided to them online, and use a 
system that was created for one purpose for another; for example, when volunteers of Map 
Action, during their response to humanitarian call, find maps or geotagged photos on the 
Web and collect them to understand some aspects of the place to which they are going to 
deploy. The information is unlikely to have been uploaded to support the emergency 
response but, because it is available and accessible, it is ready to gain new use. Another 
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form that was discussed above is ‘geocaching’ in which GPS receivers are used as part of 
leisure and play activity. The receiver is the same as the one that was designed for hiking, 
but its meaning is altered. This form of hacking is the most readily available to the majority 
of computer literate users, and is likely to happen frequently, without much thought. More 
sophisticated meaning hacking requires lateral thinking by the user, and an understanding 
that the information can be reused for their purpose and goals. Yet, if there is an obstacle 
here, it is conceptual – not technical. While this type of appropriation of tools is widely 
available, its impact is limited; for example, it is almost impossible for a marginalised group 
to galvanise enough support that will bring its activity to the level that it will appear first on 
search pages or in social media. 
The second level of hacking is ‘use hacking’. In this case, the participant is reusing some of 
the functionality of the system that was created with specific ideas in mind and translated 
to specific technical code (primary instrumentation), and is appropriating it for a new 
purpose: imbuing it with new meaning in the process and thus changing its original 
secondary instrumentation. Examples of this type of hacking are ‘memory maps’ in Flickr. In 
April 2005, Flickr added the ability to annotate photos by marking rectangular areas on 
them. The designers created this functionality probably to allow the system users to 
annotate photos by indicating names of those who appear in the photograph or note 
specific features. However, one of the users of Flickr, Matt Haughey, who also blogs (thus is 
among the few who are actively contributing to online systems), realised that he could take 
a screen shot of satellite imagery of the area in which he grew up in Google Maps, upload 
the image to Flickr (somewhat disregarding copyright issues) and use the annotation tools 
to mark specific locations on the image, attaching to them personal memories such as: ‘My 
first girlfriend lived here ("Lisa"). I met her the summer between 7th and 8th grade when 
she moved in. We never kissed, and when school started I ignored her because she was in 
7th and I was in 8th. I was an ass.’ (Figure 3). He was quickly followed by other Flickr users 
and there are now over 650 memory maps on Flickr. This personal use of web mapping and 
photo sharing systems required some technical understanding, but not at a very high level. 
Interestingly, it was quickly noticed and endorsed by the official Flickr Blog as an acceptable 
practice.  
This type of hacking is still open to a wider range of users, but requires technical knowhow. 
This is likely to be the most significant in terms of neogeography democratisation potential, 
as within many marginalised groups there are some people with some technical skills that 
will enable them to utilise tools in new ways. For example, the capability to use Google 
Earth in a way that assists local campaigns can be significant in providing easy access to 
information and tools.  
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Figure 3 – Memory map in Flickr  
The third level is ‘shallow technical hacking’, in which systems are reconfigured and 
organised to provide a new social meaning. Mashup, or the integration of information from 
multiple systems, is a good example of this.  A few weeks after Google released their 
mapping service in 2005, Paul Radamacher developed a new site that merged information 
from the San-Francisco-based free small-ads website Craigslist with Google information in a 
site called HousingMaps (Tran, 2007). This process of combining information from several 
websites and sources to produce a new web service became more common. While 
Radamacher is highly technically capable (he holds a PhD in computer science) and was able 
to understand how Google code works and change it, later on, with the publications of 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), the creation of mashups became an easier task. 
The APIs are provided with code examples. This is important for people with some ability of 
scripting, which is the writing of short computer programs that deal with fairly simple tasks 
by reusing or adapting the existing code examples without a deep understanding of the 
technology. Such users can create new mashups and, therefore, offer new configurations of 
technology. Shallow hacking requires both the aptitude to manipulate computer code and a 
technical ability to do so. What is important is that, through this reconfiguration, it is 
possible to create new representations of places. When it is done without political or social 
understanding, as Miller (2006) records in the creation of Scipionus.com as a response to 
the Hurricane Katrina disaster, it is not surprising to find out that it has failed marginalised 
groups as Crutcher and Zook (2009) show. On the other hand, McConchie and Klinkenberg 
(2011) demonstrated counter mapping of the area of Vancouver in which the Winter 
Olympics were hosted. This was carried out through reconfiguration of the Google My Maps 
facility. This is a clear example, at this level, of some democratisation in the sense of 
increasing participation and bringing voices that are silenced through the official 
representation of the city. 
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The final and fourth level is ‘deep technical hacking’. It is the closest to Feenberg’s ‘deep 
democratisation’ as it requires changes to the technical codes themselves and the creation 
of new systems that are capable of opening new political and social spaces. Sieber’s (2004) 
call for the rewiring of GIS to achieve the goals of GIS/2 works at this level. The creation of 
OpenStreetMap as a way to allow the production of free geographic information that is 
accessible to anyone and for any purpose is another example. This level of hacking requires 
very significant technical knowledge in creating new geographic data collection tools, setting 
up servers and configuring database management systems. These skills are available to only 
a small technical elite within society. Thus, such intervention in technical codes is possible 
only to those who are involved in both primary and secondary instrumentation, and are 
deliberately using the technology to open up new opportunities, expressions and 
representations. Deep technical hacking can indeed lead to a deep democratisation of 
geographic information technologies, and the integration of users’ concerns and needs in 
new systems. Examples of this are included in the community maps that are created at UCL 
(www.communitymaps.org.uk Ellul et al. 2009) where community engagement is part of the 
process of creating the maps and managing them. This participatory design of the maps 
allows the communities to express the issues that concern them through the use of 
neogeographic technologies. Another example is the creation of Map Kibera 
(www.mapkibera.org) in which OpenStreetMap was used to create the first detailed map of 
the largest informal settlement in Nairobi, which, like most informal settlements, was not 
mapped by official bodies. Thus, the act of creating the map is a political intervention in 
making the place visible and therefore the act of creating it goes beyond the practical 
humanitarian benefits of having a map.  
The hacking hierarchy can be helpful in realising the democratisation potential of 
neogeography. It provides a way to unpack Elwood (2010, p. 352) observation that ‘the 
geoweb almost certainly introduces new mechanisms of exclusion as, for instance, in the 
advantage afforded to those who have the coding skills to create their own ‘mash ups’ with 
open APIs, compared to those who can only view or contribute to such resources.’  It is clear 
to see that, as we go up the scale, the level of intervention and change of technical codes 
required becomes more significant, and the number of people that have the necessary skills 
and knowledge, the interest in making the change and the time and resources to carry them 
through decreases. So, while the potential for ‘meaning’ hacking is open to almost any 
person who can access and use the Web (and this already exclude many), the impact of such 
action is most likely to be limited and local. The most significant interventions in 
neogeographic technical codes, such as those carried out by the activists that created Map 
Kibera, require not just the creation of new technologies but also working on the ground 
with the community and then with various aid organisations and the media to promote the 
work – the act of creating an alternative rationalisation of technology requires focused and 
sustained effort on both primary and secondary instrumentation. This also brings us back to 
the PGIS and critical GIS discussion about democratisation, and shows the need for technical 
intermediaries that will facilitate the process, while showing full commitment to inclusion 
and empowerment of the people that they work with. 
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Conclusions 
The analysis of the validity of the claims of democratisation in the context of neogeography 
shows that much caution is required in the use of the term. Even in its shallow form of 
potentially increasing access to technologies, it holds very limited ground as while, indeed, 
neogeography increased quantitatively the number of people that can access and use 
geographic information it is doing so within a sector of technology savvy, educated and well 
off and not in a universal way across the wider population.  The main error in the core 
argument of those who promote it as a democratic force is the assumption that, by 
increasing the number of people who utilise geographic information in different ways and 
gain access to geographic technology, these users have been empowered and gained more 
political and social control. As demonstrated in this paper, neogeography merely opened up 
the collection and use of this information to a larger section of the affluent, educated and 
powerful part of society.  
 Moreover, the issue with neogeographic information and practices goes beyond who can 
use it. The control over the information is kept, by and large, by major corporations and the 
participant’s labour is enrolled in the service of these corporations, leaving the issue of 
payback for this effort a moot point. Significantly, the primary intention of the providers of 
the tools is not to empower communities or include marginalised groups, as they don’t 
represent a major source of revenue.    
Feenberg’s framework reminds us that all technology is political and not value neutral, and 
that politics and values are embedded into the technical codes of neogeography. Once 
these aspects are noticed, the true democratisation potential of neogeography can be 
explored and, on both empirical and analytical accounts, it is found wanting. As was the case 
with previous geographic information technologies, and as the body of research on critical 
and participatory GIS demonstrated, neogeography does have a democratisation potential 
in its fuller sense. It can be used to increase participation, empower marginalised groups 
and bring new voices that are unheard or ignored, if applied carefully and sensitively.  
The analysis of the different levels of ‘hacking’, or altering a system from its original aim, is 
provided to frame the potentials and limits of neogeographic practices. While the lower 
levels of ‘meaning hacking’ or ‘use hacking’ have, indeed, been opened up by the 
emergence of neogeography (Haklay et al. 2008), their democratic potential is limited. The 
higher levels, where deep democratisation of technology is possible (‘shallow technical 
hacking’ and ‘deep technical hacking’), require skills and aptitude that are in short supply 
and are usually beyond the reach of marginalised and excluded groups in society. They are 
even beyond the reach of most civic society organisations, since the specific technological 
elites that develop web technologies are notorious for their lack of philanthropy  (Borsook 
2000).   
Therefore, to fulfil the democratisation potential of neogeographic practices, a concerted 
effort is required to integrate new groups in society in the design and development of 
technological objects and systems and an ongoing effort to reach out to those who are 
under-represented. To do that, we need to take into account the everyday geography of 
communities in streets, villages and slums and find ways to ensure that the technical codes 
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of neogeography provide the space for the voices from these places are heard and 
represented.  
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